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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BALLOT
INITIATIVES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Craig B. Holman, Ph.D.* and Robert Stem**
Center for Governmental Studies
The history of governance in the United States is one of a con-
flict between democratic rule and the protection of civil liberties.
This conflict is perhaps most visible in the tension between the legis-
lative process and the judicial system. While legislation is often the
product of democratic majority will, the judicial system is generally
designed to be a step removed from democratic majorities-
frequently in the form of unelected and unaccountable judgeships.2
Americans select their judges through a wide array of methods,
ranging from appointive selection procedures to democratic elec-
tions. Federal judges, for example, are appointed by the President,
with the advice and consent of the Senate.3 States, on the other hand,
are free to devise their own selection procedures with relatively few
constraints imposed by federal statutory or constitutional law.4 In all
cases, the selection procedures chosen reflect a preference between
* Craig B. Holman, Ph.D., is Project Director of the Center for Govern-
mental Studies, a non-profit research organization, and Executive Director of
Californians for Political Reform Foundation, a public interest organization
committed to the defense and implementation of Proposition 208, California's
campaign finance initiative approved by voters in November 1996.
** Robert M. Stem is Co-Director and General Counsel of the Center for
Governmental Studies. Mr. Stem also regularly serves as a lecturer on elections
at the University of California at Los Angeles and has co-authored several works
on the initiative process and campaign finance. He was General Counsel for the
California Fair Political Practices Commission from 1975-1983.
1. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not those
of the Center for Governmental Studies.
2. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577,
588 (1993).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4. One scholar attributes this state independence in judicial selection to the
history of the King of England controlling the pre-Declaration of Independence
judges. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CM. L. REV. 689,714-25 (1995).
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judicial autonomy versus public accountability-or some balance in
between."
Direct democracy in California has found itself in the middle of
this unresolved conflict between democratic governance and the ju-
dicial protection of civil liberties. Californians make extensive use6 of
the initiative process, the most democratic and purely majoritarian
form of policymaking.7 Thus, it should come as no surprise that pub-
lic policies formulated through the initiative process often become
embroiled in controversy and scrutinized by the courts.
California courts, however, are not of one mind when it comes to
initiatives. Part of the reason behind the courts' diverging views on
judicial scrutiny of initiatives is that, depending on the level of court,
judges are selected through three very different methods.8 Trial court
5. The conflict between judicial autonomy and public accountability in de-
fining judicial systems arose in colonial America. See Bridget E. Montgomery &
Christopher C. Conner, Partisan Elections: The Albatross of Pennsylvania's Ap-
pellate Judiciary, 98 DICK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993). In the early 1700s, judges x% re
deemed "crown agents" who were appointed and served at the pleasure 4 the
King. See Jason Miles Levien & Stacie L. Fatka, Cleaning Up Judicial Elec.,uns:
Examining the First Amendment Limitations on Judicial Campaign Regulation, 2
MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 71, 73 (1997). At that point the judiciary was neither in-
dependent of political authorities nor accountable to the public. See id. at 74.
The Declaration of Independence decried this archaic system of justice for hav-
ing "made judges dependent on his [the King's] Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries." Id. at 73-74, (quoting
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776)). America's founders
decided to remedy this situation by providing that judges be appointed for life
and subject to removal from office only by impeachment. Eight of the original
thirteen states bestowed the power to select judges upon one or both houses of
the state legislature; New Hampshire and Pennsylvania made appointment proc-
ess a joint responsibility of the governor and the legislature; Maryland, Massa-
chusetts and New York gave the appointive authority to the governor, subject to
confirmation by the legislature. See Levien & Fatka, supra.
In the country's first years, the lack of popular election of judges at either
the federal or state level was due to the Founders' belief that the judiciary
needed to be independent of oftentimes emotive political and public whims. See
id. That attitude eventually faded in the first half of the nineteenth century with
the onslaught of the Jacksonian "revolution" against the unaccountability of gov-
ernment institutions. See id. The egalitarian philosophy engendered by Andrew
Jackson led to the democratization of most state judiciaries. See id. In 1832
Mississippi became the first state to make all judgeships elected positions, and by
the outbreak of the Civil War, twenty-four of thirty-four states elected their
judges. See id.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See Kara Christenson, Note, Interpreting the Purposes of Initiatives:
Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1035-36 (1989) (describing the initiative
process and contrasting it with legislative alternatives).
8. The method of judicial selection affects the way a judge or justice ap-
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judges in California are selected in competitive elections; appellate
justices in the state are selected through non-competitive retention
elections;0 and federal judges are selected by the President and con-
firmed by the U.S. Senate for lifetime appointment."
These differences in the system of judicial selection at the state
and federal courts have a significant impact on California's judicial
review of initiatives.
I. CHALLENGING AN INITIATIVE IN COURT CAN BE DONE
THROUGH A WIDE VARIETY OF MEANS
Initiatives can be challenged in court through a multiplicity of
ways. They can be challenged early to keep them off the ballot or
later after voter approval. They can be challenged in state courts or
in the federal courts, or both.3 Court challenges to initiatives may
follow a routine time schedule or an expedited schedule if the courts
feel pressing issues must be resolved immediately. 4 And opponents
of a voter-approved initiative may request a preliminary injunction to
suspend the initiative legislation until after a full trial.15 In short,
proaches a potentially politically charged initiative issue. See infra Part V.
9. See Robert C. Luskin et al., How minority judges fare in retention elec-
tions, 77 JUDICATURE 316,318 (1994).
10. See id.
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Carl Tobias, Choosing
Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
741, 741 (1997).
12. See Daniel J. Curtin, Jr. & M. Thomas Jacobson, Growth Control By the
Ballot Box: California's Experience, 24 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1073, 1094 (1991).
13. Compare Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir.
1997) (challenging California's Proposition 209 in federal court), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 397 (1997), with Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 218, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 241
(1978) (challenging California's Proposition 13 in state court); see also California
Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV. S-96-1965LKKDAD,
1998 WL 7173, at *1-*4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (debating whether state or fed-
eral court is the more appropriate forum to analyze California's Proposition 208).
14. Compare Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 812-14,771 P.2d
1247, 1249-50, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163-64 (1989) (noting that it took only two days
for the California Supreme Court to act after the enactment of California's
Proposition 103, staying the initiative), with Bates v. Jones, 958 F. Supp. 1446,
1453-55 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that it took six years for California's Proposi-
tion 140 to be properly considered on the merits), affd, 127 F.3d 839 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 679 (1998).
15. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1491
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of
Proposition 209 pending trial), rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), stay denied,
118 S. Ct. 17 (1997), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
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initiatives can be challenged in court in virtually all the ways that any
legislation can be legally contested.
Nevertheless, some patterns of challenging an initiative in court
are relatively common. In most states, such as California, the courts
are rarely willing to remove an initiative from the ballot prior to an
election.1" For example, the California Supreme Court displayed ju-
dicial restraint in refusing to decide the constitutionality of Proposi-
tion 8 prior to the 1982 election." Most state and federal courts ex-
ercise judicial restraint when it comes to pre-election review of
initiatives, especially pre-election review on substantive rather than
procedural grounds."' Some states even forbid pre-election review of
initiatives on substantive grounds. 9
The exercise of such restraint against pre-election review is
based on the principle that an initiative is not yet within the purview
of either the executive, legislative, or judicial branches before it goes
from a mere proposal to an actual law."' A California appellate court
echoed this sentiment when it noted, "As we have frequently ob-
served, it is usually more appropriate to review constitutional and
other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after an
election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the
16. See JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 105-06 (1989).
17. See id. at 107-09.
1& See id. at 105-06; see also Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 641 P.2d 200,
201, 181 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1982) (denying pre-election review of Proposition
8).
19. See Stan P. Geurin, Comment, Pre-Election Judicial Review: The Right
Choice, 17 OKLA. CTrY U. L. REV. 221, 221 n.6 (1992).
This ban on pre-election review of initiatives is not the case for all states,
however. Florida, in fact, requires substantive pre-election review of initiative
proposals.
Following a series of last-minute court challenges to a number of ini-
tiatives from 1982 through 1984, Florida voters ratified a 1986 consti-
tutional amendment requiring state supreme court review of all initia-
tives which collected 10% of the requisite signatures. The 10%
threshold is designed to avoid burdening the court with frivolous ini-
tiative proposals. The state supreme court analyzes the initiative pro-
posals for compliance with the single-subject rule and other statutory
criteria. The court then issues an advisory opinion on the measure's
validity.
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY INI-
TIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA's FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, 108-09
(1992). The court's advisory opinion is not binding, but is considered "extremely
persuasive" in a later court challenge. See id. at 109.
20. See James D. Gordon III & David B. Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Re-
view of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 298, 311 (1989).
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exercise of the people's franchise, in the absence of some clear
showing of invalidity."21
Where permissible,2 in order to justify pre-election review on
substantive grounds, opponents of an initiative petition must be able
to demonstrate convincingly that the measure will be invalidated and
that permitting a vote on the issue is likely to cause significant harm.'
Rationales for pre-election review have included prevention of fiscal
waste in conducting the election, federal preemption, and judicial
economy.' In California, only six initiatives and referendums have
been subjected to pre-election judicial review.' Of these, only three
initiatives have been removed from the ballot.' These include a 1983
reapportionment initiative.' a 1984 federal balanced budget amend-
ment initiative, and a 1988 no-fault insurance reform initiative.2
21. Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 4,641 P.2d at 201, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
22. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 20, at 302-03 (describing three cate-
gories of justifiable pre-election review).
23. See id.
24. See M. Sean Radcliffe, Comment, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initia-
tive Petitions: An Unreasonable Limitation on Political Speech, 30 TULSA L.J.
425, 430-31 (1994).
25. See Gordon & Magleby, supra note 20, at 301-03.
26. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
27. The Sebastiani reapportionment initiative, as it was called prior to being
placed on the ballot, would have modified the Democratic Legislature's reap-
portionment plan and caused more favorable districting for state Republicans.
See Philip Hager, Remapping Vote Voided by High Court, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 16,
1983, at Al. The California Supreme Court ruled that the initiative was uncon-
stitutional as clearly conflicting with the state constitution. See Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 680, 669 P.2d 17, 30, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781,794 (1983).
28. The initiative was passed on the ballot as Proposition 35, "The Balanced-
Budget Initiative." See Myma Oliver, Balanced-Budget Vote Killed: High Court
Removes Initiative From Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1984, at Al. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court found this initiative invalid on its face because the legislature
votes on the budget, not the citizenry. See AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 694,
686 P.2d 609, 613, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1984).
29. The 1988 no-fault insurance reform initiative was drafted and circulated
by groups associated with the insurance industry. The measure was a 12,000-
word tome that contained a hidden sentence exempting the insurance industry
from campaign contribution limits. The court disqualified the measure from the
ballot on the grounds that it obviously violated the single-subject rule. See Cali-
fornia Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Inc. v. Eu, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351, 354-56, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 916, 917-18 (1988). Proponents removed the offending provision and recir-
culated the new version in an intense direct mail drive. After spending $2.3 mil-
lion on the direct mail circulation drive, proponents were able to gather 167% of
the requisite signatures in a brief 48 days. The revised initiative survived further
judicial review and was placed on the ballot. See Insurance Indus. Initiative
Campaign Comm. v. Eu, 203 Cal. App. 3d 961, 963, 250 Cal. Rptr. 320, 321
(1988).
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More commonly, initiatives in California and other jurisdictions
are challenged after voters have approved them. Initiatives are
challenged on a wide variety of grounds. Most often, state and fed-
eral courts may invalidate an initiative for violating some constitu-
tional principle. Less often, initiatives will be contested for conflict-
ing with a higher federal law, known as "federal preemption."3
Courts may invalidate an initiative for addressing more than one
subjectnz or for exceeding certain subject limitations, such as high-
lighting a specific individual or corporation for regulation.3 Finally, a
California initiative may amend the state constitution but may not
fundamentally revise the constitutionY
In most jurisdictions, each county at the state level or each dis-
trict at the federal level determines its own rules for allocating cases
among specific judges. While "judge shopping" is illegal in all juris-
dictions,35 determining the court in which to file is part and parcel of a
prudent legal strategy. If prior rulings suggest that judges in one dis-
trict are more hostile to an initiative than judges in another district,
filing in the more hostile district increases the odds of overturning the
initiative.
Generally, computers assign cases randomly to judges in the
county or district. There are significant exceptions, however. Senior
judges receive fewer case assignments because of their additional
administrative workload. Further, the court clerk automatically re-
cuses judges with business or personal ties to a case. Frequently, the
assignment of emergency filings is in consecutive rather than random
30. See, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 355, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089,
276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 338 (1990) (en bane) (concluding that California Proposition
115 violates state constitutional principles as being a revision, not an amend-
ment); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1499-1510 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (concluding that California's Proposition 209 violates federal equal protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment), rev'd, 122 F.3d at 709.
31. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1511-20 (concluding that
Proposition 209 is preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), rev'd,
122 F.3d at 710.
32. See, e.g., Missourians to Protect the Initiative Process v. Blunt, 799
S.W.2d 824 (Mo. 1990) (en banc); In re Initiative Petition No. 314, 625 P.2d 595
(Okla. 1980).
33. See, e.g., Pala Band of Mission Indians v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal.
App. 4th 565, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (1997); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48
Cal. 3d 805,771 P.2d 1247,258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989).
34. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2-3; Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 506,
816 P.2d 1309, 1316,286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 290 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Cal. R. U.S.D.C.N.D. Civ. L.R. 3-3(c); La. R. 18th Dist. Ct. R. 9;
Ohio Sup. R. 36 commentary.
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order. Also, judges may on occasion exercise some discretion in con-
solidating multiple filings on the same initiative by assigning them to
a particular judge with special expertise in the field.
For example, in California, opponents of a 1996 campaign re-
form measure, Proposition 208, filed five separate actions, all in the
United States District Court, Eastern District of California." The
district has eight judges in all, two of them senior judges with limited
caseloads. Not coincidentally, the federal judge serving the district
had previously voided campaign finance legislation and an earlier
state campaign finance reform initiative-Proposition 73.' The five
actions were distributed randomly among the judges but then con-
solidated in one court. The guiding principle for consolidation in
this district was that the judge who receives the lowest case number,
or first filing, of these five actions, or of a related case, receives the
consolidated actions. A "related case" could include a prior case
dealing with a similar subject, and the prior case would then become
the lowest case number. Consequently, this consolidation process
transformed all five actions against Proposition 208 into one case to
be heard by the same judge who had previously invalidated Proposi-
tion 73.39 In a decision that both proponents and opponents of
Proposition 208 alike expected, this federal district judge ruled
against the measure.' °
II. SHOULD THERE BE A STRICTER STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR
INITIATIVES?
Despite the apparent contradiction between the "republican
form of government" guaranteed in the United States Constitution41
and "direct democracy" embodied by initiatives, the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1912 found that the initiative process itself was not at odds
36. See John Jacobs, Courts Speed Up Hearings on Props, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRiB., May 31, 1997, at B6; Dan Bernstein, Prop. 208 Has Some Dazed, Con-
fused, Exaggerating, SACRAMENTo BEE, June 15,1997, at Al.
37. See Service Employees Int'l Union v. FPPC, 721 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. Cal.
1989) (Karlton, C.J., holding that law prohibiting candidates from expending car-
ryover funds in campaigns for elective office violated First Amendment).
38. See supra note 36, at Al.
39. See Carl Ingram & Max Vanzi, Lawyers Finish Arguments on Proposition
208, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A3.
40. See California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV.
S-96-1965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998). The case is
on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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with the form of governance established under the Federal Constitu-
tion.42 In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,43 the
high court ruled that the initiative process was simply an additional
form of government that complements rather than contradicts the
federal form of government and representative democracy. Since
that ruling, courts have not questioned the underlying legitimacy of
the initiative process.
Instead, judicial attention has focused on the appropriate stan-
dard of review for assessing the constitutionality of individual initia-
tives. The courts have generally operated under the presumption
that both legislation and initiatives are subject to similar standards of
review and constitutional scrutiny. 4 Chief Justice Burger clearly ex-
pressed this viewpoint in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley" when he said, "It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a
legislative body enacted [this law] because the voters may no more
violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legisla-
tive body may do so by enacting legislation.,
46
Nevertheless, the debate over the appropriate standard of review
for initiatives continues to rage, especially in academic circles. Some
legal scholars have argued that initiatives require even stricter stan-
dards of scrutiny than those applicable to representative legislation.47
They base their argument on several premises. First, academics ar-
gue that initiatives, as a tool of majoritarian democracy, dispropor-
tionately attack the civil liberties of minorities.48 To illustrate, initia-
tives have on occasion been used to undermine the rights of ethnic
minorities,49 gays and lesbians,' immigrants,5' and other minorities.?
42. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
43. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
44. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Forty-Fourth Gen. Assem-
bly v. Lucas, 379 U.S. 693 (1965); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 669
P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983).
45. 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
46. Id. at 295.
47. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1558 (1990).
48. See William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Chal-
lenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian Tyranny, and Direct Democ-
racy, 55 OHIo ST. L.J. 583, 628 (1994).
49. See Proposition 14 (Rumford Fair Housing Initiative) in CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION 13-14, 18-20 (Nov. 3, 1964).
50. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
51. See Proposition 187, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECTION 50-55 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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Accordingly, academics often contend that initiatives require stricter
review for the protection of civil liberties.'
While there are certainly valid examples of initiative legislation
that have threatened civil liberties, no one can claim that this is
solely, or even disproportionately, the purview of initiative legisla-
tion. The story of American governance is fraught with examples of
legislation by representative bodies that has violated the civil liberties
of minorities. The internment of Japanese-Americans during World
War II,' segregation and poll taxes,.5 racial gerrymandering,56 and ob-
scenity laws' are just a few examples of such legislation. Legislative
bodies have also enacted many of the anti-gay, anti-immigrant and
anti-crime proposals ascribed to initiatives. 8 The principle that both
initiatives and representative legislation should be subject to equal
standards of judicial review is not lost on those interested in protec-
tion of civil liberties.
A second argument frequently voiced for a stricter standard of
scrutiny on initiative legislation is that initiatives are not drafted with
the same deliberateness as legislation from representative bodies. 9
Initiatives are frequently written by a group of similarly-minded in-
dividuals. As the product of subgroups, initiatives can lack the input
of opposing viewpoints and the scrutiny of other experts in the field
and thus contain oversights and unintended consequences. In Cali-
fornia, for example, one group drafted and sponsored a campaign fi-
nance reform measure, Proposition 212, which accidentally would
have deleted the state's major ethics laws.6
52. See Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECION 30-33 (Nov. 5, 1996).
53. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 48, at 623-24; Eule, supra note 47, at 1525,
1545.
54. Exec. Order No. 9,066,3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
55. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer
v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
56. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Hays v. State of La., 839 F.
Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993).
57. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
5& See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (addressing Congress's anti-crime statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922,
which controls the presence of guns in school zones); Flores-Arellano v. INS, 5
F.3d 360 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting the meaning of federal immigration statute
8 U.S.C. § 1257).
59. See Eule, supra note 47, at 1555-56.
60. See Mark Gladstone, Battle Over Campaign Reform Goes to Court, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 1996, at A3.
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This problem, however, is not unique to initiatives. Legislation
drafted in representative bodies is, in fact, routinely drafted by spe-
cial-interest groups and their lobbyists, not necessarily with an eye
for the welfare of the general public. A classic example is Califor-
nia's insurance law6 prior to being changed by an initiative. 2 In the
late 1980s, Assembly Speaker Willie Brown sat down at Frank Fat's
restaurant in Sacramento with insurance industry lobbyists and trial
lawyers. 3 He negotiated an agreement, written on a cocktail napkin,
in which the insurance industry obtained an insurance law with no
controls on prices and the trial lawyers were rewarded no control on
lawyers' fees and damage awards.' All interests were considered ex-
cept those of California's consumers, who subsequently revolted and
rewrote the state's insurance policy by initiative and placed controls
on insurance costs.6
More recently, the California legislature approved a bold anti-
smoking law.' This law prohibits smoking in almost all public places,
including bars, in order to protect the health of employees. ' But the
legislature neglected to clarify issues of enforcement. Bar owners are
supposed to take "reasonable steps" to enforce the ban,6 but no one
is sure what that means. The law delegates enforcement to the cities
and counties, with no clear division of authority. In some instances,
a county has the authority either to require bars to post no-smoking
signs but no authority to prosecute within certain cities or to make
61. See Stephen D. Sugarman, California's Insurance Regulation Resolution:
The First Two Years of Proposition 103, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 683,714 (1990).
62. See Proposition 103, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL
ELECIION 98-101, 140-44 (Nov. 8, 1988).
63. See Paul F. Arentz, Defining "Professional Negligence" After Central Pa-
thology Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court: Should California's Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act Cover Intentional Torts? 30 CAL. W. L. REV.
221, 263 n.24 (1994).
64. See Daniel M. Weintraub, Lobbyists, Lawyers Cut Deal in Injury Liabil-
ity, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1987, at Al.
65. The cocktail napkin on which Willie Brown wrote his agreement has since
been framed and is currently hanging on the wall of Frank Fat's in Sacramento.
66. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (West 1989 & West Supp. 1998); see also
Dan Morain, Smoke Set to Clear in Bars-But Will It?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22,
1997, at Al (discussing impact of § 6404.5).
67. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 6404.5(a).
68. See id. § 6404.5(c).
69. See id. § 6404.5(j).
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city officials prosecute violations.'0 This situation has led to inconsis-
tent enforcement of the law throughout the state."
The election process itself provides the greatest safeguard
against poorly drafted initiatives: through the course of a campaign,
debate usually points out and even exaggerates flaws in initiatives,
and voters tend to react accordingly. Voters tend to be very cautious
and thus are reluctant to approve initiatives at the ballot box. His-
torically, California's initiatives average a one-third approval rate.
This reluctance dramatically increases when voters are uncertain
about a measure. When uncertain, the voter generally casts a vote
against an initiative in order to maintain the existing public order."
Because of uncertainty, voters rejected Proposition 212, which inad-
vertently would have deleted California's ethics laws.
The problems that plague the initiative process also plague the
legislative process. Both processes produce laws which tread on civil
liberties, and both produce laws which restore civil liberties. Both
produce laws with unintended consequences, and both produce laws
to correct inadequate public policies.
Strictly from the perspective of policy outputs, both initiatives
and legislation from representative bodies must be subject to judicial
review to ensure sufficient and adequate safeguards. Still, there ex-
ists in fact an important difference in standards of review for initia-
tive legislation. The distinction is not in the different treatment of
initiatives and legislation, however, but in the different approaches
taken by the state and federal courts when reviewing initiatives. The
state and federal courts apply different standards of judicial scrutiny
to initiatives. This practice is beginning to turn the judicial system
into an unwitting player in the politics of direct democracy.
70. See id. §§ 6404.5(c) & (i).
71. See Jeff Leeds, Bar Patrons Still Smoke Despite Ban, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1998, at B1.
72. See Robyn R. Polashuk, Protecting the Public Debate: The Validity of the
Fairness Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 391, 402-03
(1993) (citing CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DE-
MOCRACY BY INrIATIvE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT 367 (1992)).
73. See Polashuk, supra note 72, at 403 (discussing that voters frequently shift
their positions on initiatives during the campaign, typically ending in opposition).
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IMl. CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS SHOW SOME DEFERENCE TO
INITIATIVES
Although the principle of judicial review of ballot initiatives ap-
pears firmly entrenched, courts in some states, including California,
express considerable deference to initiatives and have shown a reluc-
tance to overturn them in their entirety.74 At one time, Colorado's
Constitution forbade pre-election and post-election judicial review of
initiatives."' The language of Nevada's Constitution provides a three
year moratorium on legislative review of initiatives although Ne-
vada's state courts do not consider themselves bound by this prohibi-
76tion.
Traditionally, California's state courts have treated direct de-
mocracy with considerable respect. This feeling was articulated in a
1978 California Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutional-
ity of Proposition 13, which addressed tax relief: "It is our solemn
duty to 'jealously guard' the initiative process, it being 'one of the
precious rights of our democratic process."" State courts have fol-
lowed this principle on several other occasions. 8
Nevertheless, the state courts' respect for the initiative process
has not meant that courts have shied away from judicial review of
initiatives. California's state courts have reviewed a number of ini-
tiatives for constitutionality. 9 From 1964 to the 1990 primary
74. See Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 683, 669 P.2d 17, 35, 194
Cal. Rptr. 781, 799 (1993) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (noting the special and fa-
vored treatment of initiatives when reviewed by the court).
75. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (repealed 1966).
76. See NEv. CONST. art. XIX, § 2; Nevada Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 910 P.2d 898
(Nev. 1996) (reviewing a term limits initiative for state and federal constitutional
violations); Choose Life Campaign '90' v. Del Papa, 801 P.2d 1384, 1386-87 (Nev.
1990) (holding that arguments drafted by the Secretary of State for and against a
referendum were false and misleading); Torvinen v. Rollins, 560 P.2d 915, 917
(Nev. 1977) (holding amendment to be effective on date votes for amendment
were canvassed).
77. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
22 Cal. 3d 208, 248, 548 P.2d 1281, 1302, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 259 (1978) (quoting
Associates Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 591, 557 P.2d
473, 477, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1976).
78. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d 47, 648
P.2d 935, 184 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1982); Los Angeles County Transp. Comm'n v.
Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d 197, 643 P.2d 941, 182 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1982); Board of Su-
pervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980).
79. See Doug Willis, Get Ready for Another Wild Election Year in 1998, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS POLITICAL SERvICE, Sept. 28, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2552458. "In the past decade, more than 300 petition drives for initiatives have
been started, with only 85 collecting enough signatures to go on the ballot. But
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election, 79 initiatives have qualified for the state ballot." Of these
balloted initiatives, 21 have encountered either pre-election or post-
election challenges in state or federal court.81 The courts, however,
have upheld slightly less than half of these initiatives-only 10-
either substantially or in their entirety.'
Most of these contested initiatives and citizen-initiated referen-
dums from 1964 to 1990 were challenged in the state courts.8 Only
one such challenge was originally filed in the federal court system;
two other challenges went through the state courts and were ap-
pealed to the federal court system.? Eighteen, or 86%, of the 21
challenged initiatives and referendums were decided at the state
court level. 6
From 1964 through 1990, the state courts were willing to exercise
their authority to overturn or substantially modify initiatives and ref-
erendums, upholding or substantially upholding 56% and invalidating
or substantially invalidating 44% of the 18 challenges heard at the
state level.' But the state courts have completely invalidated only 6
initiatives over this 25 year time period." During the last 15 years of
this period, from 1974 to 1990, the state courts were been particularly
hesitant to invalidate initiatives. Only 3 of the 29 initiatives approved
voters defeated 61 of those initiatives, and among the 24 they approved, part or
all of 16 were overturned in court." Id.
80. See infra Table 1.
81. See infra Table 1.
82. See infra Table 1.
83. See infra Table 1.
84. See infra Table 1.
85. See infra Table 1.
86. See infra Table 1.
87. See infra Table 1.
88. See, e.g., Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537
(1966) (holding that Proposition 15-the Free Television Act, prohibiting pay
television in the home-abridged state and federal free speech guarantees);
Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 11 Cal. 4th 607, 905 P.2d 1248, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 108 (1991) (holding that judicial review of Proposition 68, which limited
campaign contributions, could not save unconstitutional initiative); Chemical
Specialties Mfg. Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663, 278 Cal. Rptr. 128
(1991)(holding that Proposition 105-the Public's Right to Know Act-was in-
valid because it violated the single subject rule); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34
Cal. 3d 658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (holding that Sebastiani Redis-
tricting Initiative was precluded by constitutional provision limiting redistricting
to once per 10-year period); California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Eu, 200 Cal. App.
3d 351, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1988) (holding that No Fault Insurance Initiative vio-
lated single subject rule); American Fed'n of Labor-Congress of Indus. Org. v.
Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609, 206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984) (holding Balanced
Budget Taxpayer Initiative, directing or requesting Congress to request a Consti-
tutional Convention, but which did not enact legislation of any kind, was invalid).
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TABLE I
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES
1964 THROUGH 1990 PRIMARY ELECTIONS
Titled Initiatives, 1964- 1990 Primary 476
Qualified Initiatives 79
Percentage Qualified 17%
Approved Initiatives 34
Percentage Approved 44%
Contested Initiatives 21
Percentage Contested of Balloted Initiatives 27%
Contested Initiatives Upheld 10
Percentage Contested Upheld 48%
Reviewed by State Courts 18
Percentage Reviewed by State Courts 86%
Upheld by State Courts 10
Percentage Upheld by State Courts 56%
Reviewed by State/Federal Courts 2
Percentage reviewed by State/Federal Courts 9%
Upheld by State/Federal Courts 0
Percentage Upheld by State/Federal Courts 0%
Reviewed by Federal Courts 1
Percentage Reviewed by Federal Courts 5%
Upheld by Federal Courts 0
Percentage Upheld by Federal Courts 0%
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by voters during that time were invalidated in their entirety: Propo-
sition 6 regarding inheritance tax; Proposition 68, campaign finance;
and Proposition 105, disclosure.'
Although they reviewed a smaller number of cases, the federal
courts have not shown any similar deference to initiatives during the
same period. Of the 3 challenged initiatives that originated or ended
up in the federal court system, none were upheldY Proposition 14,
addressing fair housing, and Proposition 73, campaign finance, were
entirely or substantially invalidated by the federal courts,9' and a bal-
anced budget initiative was removed from the ballot in a pre-election
challenge.'
IV. FEDERAL COURTS APPEAR MORE WILLING TO INVALIDATE
INITIATIVES
While California's state courts have shown some deference to
initiatives, the federal courts have not been perceived as showing a
similar reluctance to review and invalidate initiatives. It is not at all
clear at this point whether this perception is valid. Nevertheless, an
entirely new pattern of judicial review of initiatives is emerging from
the federal courts.
Perhaps unwittingly, the federal courts have become key players
in California's initiative process. The willingness of the federal courts
to invalidate initiatives prior to 1990,"3 bolstered by a growing under-
standing within the legal community of the differences in judicial cul-
ture between an elective state judiciary and an appointed federal ju-
diciary, has caused opponents of initiatives to increasingly take their
89. See, e.g., Estate of Cirone 153 Cal. App. 3d 199, 200 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1984)
(invalidating Proposition 6); Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Po-
litical Practices Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 991, 260 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1989)
(invalidating Proposition 68); Chemical Specialties, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 128 (invalidating Proposition 105).
90. See infra Appendix A.
91. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding that Proposition 14,
which amended the California Constitution so as to prohibit the state from deny-
ing residents the right to decline to sell, lease or rent property to any person
within their absolute discretion, impermissibly involved the state in private racial
discriminations); Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices
Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312 (1992) (holding that Proposition 73, governing candi-
dates' fiscal spending, was unconstitutional).
92. See supra Table 1.
93. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 2
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES
1990 THROUGH 1996 GENERAL ELECTIONS
Titled Initiatives, 1990 - 1996 General 199
Qualified Initiatives 44
Percentage Qualified 22%
Approved Initiatives 15
Percentage Approved 34%
Contested Initiatives 9
Percentage Contested of Balloted Initiatives 21%
Contested Initiatives Upheld 4
Percentage Contested Upheld 44%
Reviewed by State Courts 2
Percentage Reviewed by State Courts 22%
Upheld by State Courts 2
Percentage Upheld by State Courts 100%
Reviewed by State/Federal Courts 2
Percentage reviewed by State/Federal Courts 22%
Upheld by State/Federal Courts 1
Percentage Upheld by State/Federal Courts 50%
Reviewed by Federal Courts 5
Percentage Reviewed by Federal Courts 56%
Upheld by Federal Courts 2
Percentage Upheld by Federal Courts 40%
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FIGURE 1
COURT JURISDIcTION OF CONTESTED INITIATIVES:
1964 - 1990 PRIMARY V. 1990 - 1996 GENERAL
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case to federal rather than state court.94 The dramatic shift in filing
challenges to California's initiatives in federal rather than state court
began with the 1990 general election. Since then, opponents of ini-
tiatives in California have consistently filed in the federal courts.
As shown in Figure 1, the pattern of challenging initiatives has
dramatically and overwhelmingly shifted between the time periods of
1964 through the 1990 primary election and the 1990 general election
to present. While state courts reviewed 86% of all contested initia-
tives from 1964 to 1990,9" they reviewed only 22% from 1990 to
1996.9 The federal courts have clearly become the preferred venue
for these challenges. While only 5% of challenged initiatives were
filed with the federal courts from 1964 to 1990, 56% of all challenges
were filed with the federal courts from 1990 to 1996.' The role of the
federal courts in the initiative process appears even greater when
looking at the number of initiatives that currently end up in the fed-
eral courts, regardless of where the challenges were originally filed.
An overwhelming 78% of all challenges to California's initiatives
since the general election of 1990 have ended up in the federal courts
for a final decision, compared to 14% in the previous 26 years."
This change is not due to federal judges' stepping into the fray
but due to the fact that opponents of initiatives have generally by-
passed the state court system and filed their challenges directly in
federal district court. A new, aggressive attitude has developed
among those who campaign against initiatives to continue the fight by
other means-federal litigation.
Federal litigation is thus fast becoming another step in an oppo-
sition campaign strategy. If opponents fail to defeat an initiative at
the ballot box, a portion of the campaign budget is routinely set aside
94. See, e.g., Walton v. Walton, 31 Cal. App. 4th 277, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901
(1995) (discussing Proposition 164); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wil-
son, 131 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing Proposition 187); California Demo-
cratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D Cal. 1997) (discussing Proposition
198); California Prolife Council Political Action Comm. v. Scully, No. CIV. S-96-
1965LKKDAD, 1998 WL 7173 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1998) (discussing Proposition
208); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(discussing Proposition 209); People v. Trippet, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1532, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 559 (1997) (discussing Proposition 215).
95. See supra Table 1.
96. See supra Table 2.
97. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
98. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
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FIGURE 2
PERCENTAGE OF VOTER-APPROVED INITIATIVES
CHALLENGED IN COURT:
1964 - 1990 PRIMARY V. 1990 - 1996 GENERAL
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to contest the initiative in federal court." Consequently, there has
been a modest but significant increase in the likelihood that an ini-
tiative approved by the voters will be litigated. Given the large in-
crease in balloted initiatives in the 1990s, the percentage of contested
initiatives of all balloted initiatives before and after 1990 are compa-
rable. However, when looking at those initiatives that have been ap-
proved by voters, 60% of all voter-approved initiatives have faced
litigation since the 1990 general election, compared to 53% prior."°
There is some indication that this strategy may be paying off
for opponents of initiatives. Challenging initiatives in the state court
system traditionally has been a 50-50 proposition given state judges'
deference to initiatives. But the federal court system-with its life-
time appointive system for judges-offers an entirely different out-
look for the survival of initiatives.
Once again, the number of cases is small; but a pattern of judicial
decision-making is becoming apparent. As shown in Table 2, both
initiatives filed and decided in state courts since 1990-Proposition
184, "Three Strikes," and Proposition 213, which excludes drunk
drivers and uninsured motorists from seeking non-economic damages
in suits-have been entirely or substantially upheld."' Five initiatives
have been challenged in the federal courts since 1990, with only two
being upheld thus far. That means about three-fifths of initiatives
filed in the federal court system have been entirely or substantially
invalidated to date. This pattern stands in sharp contrast to the state
court system, which has not invalidated any initiative since the 1990
general election.
A word of caution about these figures needs to be pointed out,
however. Unlike the data for the period prior to the 1990 general
election, in which all the cases have been decided, many of the initia-
tives challenged since 1990 are still pending or on appeal.' 2 Although
opponents evidently believe their chances of overturning voter-
approved initiatives are better in the federal courts than the state
courts-and the early results suggest they may be correct-it is
99. See Charles M. Price, Shadow Government, CAL. J., Oct. 1997, at 32-33.
100. See infra Figure 2.
101. See Yoshioka v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 4th 972, 986, 993, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 553, 560, 564 (1997) (holding that Proposition 213 did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution or the single subject re-
quirement of the California Constitution).
102. See Appendix B at 53.
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uncertain whether the appellate courts in the federal system will fol-
low suit.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The difference in the way state courts and federal courts treat
initiatives is largely attributable to the different judicial cultures
arising from their respective judicial selection processes. Most state
judges, including those in California, are elected to office, a process
which emphasizes judicial accountability to the public. Federal
judges, however, are appointed for life and may be removed only
through impeachment, which emphasizes judicial independence from
the public.' Regardless of the relative merit of accountability versus
independence, the difference in emphasis is likely to influence the
court's willingness to void all or part of an initiative.
Associate Justice Otto Kaus, who served on the California Su-
preme Court from 1980 through 1985, described the different judicial
cultures between an elective system and an appointive system with a
metaphor. °4 Justice Kaus said that reviewing the constitutionality of
an initiative when facing reelection is like finding a crocodile in your
bathtub in the morning.0 5 You try not to think about the crocodile,
but you know it is there, and it is hard to think of much else while
shaving.1' 6
103. See CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, THE PRICE OF
JUSTICE 74 (1995). Competitive elections clearly are the most common method
of judicial selection with 29 states primarily using election contests to select
judges. Twelve of these states conduct their competitive judicial elections on
partisan ballots. Several states also employ partisan ballots for noncompetitive
retention elections. The remaining 17 states that primarily select their judges
through competitive elections place the contests on nonpartisan ballots.
Ten states use the retention election process for selecting most judges. Not
all retention systems are the same. Several retention election systems, such as
California's method of selecting appellate judges, do not include a merit selection
process.
Eleven states, plus the District of Columbia, primarily employ an appoint-
ment method of judicial selection among most of their jurisdiction's courts. The
appointing authority ranges from both houses of the legislature in South Carolina
and Virginia-Rhode Island for Supreme Court only-to the U.S. Senate in the
District of Columbia. Most states, however, vest this responsibility with the gov-
ernor. See id.; JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A
STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 3-4 (1989).
104. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Inde-
pendence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1133, 1133 (1997).
105. See id.
106. See id.
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While no self-respecting judge would sacrifice constitutional
principles in the face of reelection opportunities, the point that can
be drawn from Justice Kaus is that an elective system does somewhat
increase judicial accountability. For example, in a recent decision
upholding Proposition 140 on term limits, the California Supreme
Court opined that
[a]lthough the legislative power under our state Constitution is
vested in the Legislature, "the people reserve to themselves the
powers of initiative and referendum." Accordingly, the initia-
tive power must be liberally construed to promote the demo-
cratic process. Indeed, it is our solemn duty to jealously guard
the precious initiative power, and to resolve any reasonable
doubts in favor of its exercise.107
However, this has not meant that state courts are insensitive to
constitutional issues when it comes to reviewing initiatives. As
shown above, the state courts have been reluctant to overturn entire
initiatives."' Rather, the state courts have frequently used a scalpel
to sever the offending sections of initiatives.' 9 Proposition 140, for
example, was left mostly intact; but the court did remove the initia-
tive's retroactive sanction against legislative pensions.110 A section of
Proposition 115-addressing victim's rights-was removed because
the court felt it impinged on federal authority, though the initiative
itself was substantially upheld."' More recently, the California Su-
preme Court modified Proposition 184 to give trial judges the same
right to strike prior felony convictions as is given to district attor-
neys.
112
Conversely, in an appointive judicial selection system, life-
tenured judges remain comfortably aloof of the public's will. From
this difference in judicial selection procedure stems a difference in
judicial culture between the state and federal courts. Although this
difference should not be overstated, opponents of initiatives have
realized the difference in judicial cultures and have incorporated the
107. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 500-01, 816 P.2d 1309, 1312-13, 286 Cal.
Rptr. 283,286-87 (1991) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1) (citations omitted).
10& See supra Part III.
109. See Price, supra note 95, at 37.
110. See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1991).
111. See Izazaga v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr.
231 (1991); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 355-56, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089-90,
276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 338-39 (1990); Price, supra note 95, at 37.
112. See Price, supra note 95, at 37.
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use of federal courts as part of a comprehensive opposition campaign
strategy.
In recent years, Congress has considered proposals for moderat-
ing federal court authority to overturn state initiatives."' Regardless
of the merits of some of the provisions of these bills, they have thus
far been presented as an ideological attack on "liberal judges" of the
federal courts, resulting in the alienation of many Democratic con-
gressional members. 4 Ironically, some of the initiatives that federal
judges temporarily enjoined, such as an initiative eliminating af-
firmative action, have since been upheld. In an unusually sharp
personal attack on the federal district judge who struck down the
measure, a three-judge appellate panel wrote: "A system which per-
mits one judge to block with a stroke of the pen what 4,736,180
[actually, 5,268,462] state residents voted to enact as law tests the in-
tegrity of our constitutional democracy."' 5
Although these bills have contained several provisions, the key
element of each bill is a proposal that all federal challenges to state
initiatives be heard first by a three-judge federal panel." This pro-
posal follows a long tradition of federal judicial practice."7
From 1910 through 1976, a federal statute required a three-judge
panel to address any suit seeking an injunction against implementa-
tion of a legislative statute on grounds of federal constitutional is-
sues.18 The federal statute'was amended in 1976, leaving the three-
judge panel requirement to apply only in two types of cases: suits in-
volving apportionment of congressional and legislative districts and
suits otherwise required to be heard by a three-judge panel,"9 such as
those filed under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'2 Congress eased
113. See H.R. 1170, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997).
114. The primary bills are HR 1170 and HR 1252. See supra note 109.
115. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir.
1977).
116. See H.R 1252, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing a three judge requirement).
Other provisions of HR 1170 include: granting courts of appeals discretion to
allow interlocutory appeals from district court orders that determine whether an
action may be maintained as a class action; limiting the power of the federal ju-
diciary to impose new taxes on states; and permitting proponents and opponents
one opportunity to reassign the case to another judge:
117. See Bruce L. Moyer, Judge's Pay Delinkage & COLA Relief Near Pas-
sage, 44 FED. LAw. 8, 9 (Oct. 1997).
118. See Act of" Mar. 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-445, 37 Stat. 1013 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1994)).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
120. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)
(1994)).
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the requirement that a three-judge panel hear all contested state
statutes because of the burden it had placed on the federal court
system.
Requiring a panel of three district court judges to hear chal-
lenges to state initiatives would not impose a similar burden on fed-
eral courts. At most, about a dozen or so state initiatives might be
challenged in federal court each election year.m This would not con-
stitute an overly burdensome caseload.
While the costs to the federal judiciary would be negligible, the
benefits are potentially significant. Citizens are likely to feel more
concerned and involved with legislation emerging from the initiative
process than with the remote legislation produced by legislatures.
When federal judges strike down initiatives, voters frequently react
with hostility toward the judiciary and conclude that the personal
prejudices of one judge have been unfairly imposed upon an entire
state.2' This attitude is reflected in a growing distrust of both the ju-
diciary-at both the state and federal levels-and the initiative proc-
ess itself.'U
For example, California Supreme Court justices had been readily
confirmed in judicial retention elections throughout the state's his-
tory.'2 Since the 1986 voter revolt against Chief Justice Bird and
three other colleagues who undercut much of the death penalty ini-
tiative," most justices have received an average 40% "no" vote in re-
tention elections.m Once a highly esteemed governmental body, the
courts-state and federal alike-are beginning to lose some of the
public's confidence. Striking down popular initiatives has likely con-
tributed to this loss in confidence.
At the same time, voters in California are growing increasingly
frustrated with the initiative process. Surveys show that while over-
whelming majorities of Californians want to preserve the right of ini-
tiative, they also want some reforms of the process."' Some 74% of
respondents believe that the initiative process is generally a good
121. See S. Rep. No. 94-204, at 3-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1988, 1990-
91.
122. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying appendices.
123. See Prince, supra note 95, at 38.
124. See id.
125. See id.-
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See John Jacobs, Polk Voters Like Initiative Process, But Want it Fixed,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 9,1997, at B7.
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thing, but almost as many respondents want to see some changes to
it.'29 One of the most popular proposals for change is to restrict court
invalidation of initiatives.'
For the reason of public alienation alone, it is appropriate to
provide special safeguards for federal judicial review of state initia-
tives. The modest proposal of requiring a hearing by a panel of three
district judges could go a long way toward assuaging the public's dis-
enchantment with the judiciary and the initiative process. Determi-
nations by a three-judge panel are more likely to be deliberative and
fair, overcoming the particular biases of a single judge, and are likely
to be seen as such by the public.
VI. CONCLUSION: PROMOTE DELIBERATENESS IN JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
Judicial intervention in the legislative process, including legisla-
tion by initiative, is and must continue to be a hallowed principle of
American governance. It is designed, in part, to protect civil liberties
against the potential excesses of majoritarian democracy. Legislation
by initiative is majoritarian democracy in its purest sense and clearly
must be subject to judicial review.
When the courts invalidate initiatives, however, the ramifica-
tions are far greater than court invalidation of most other legislation.
Initiatives usually address issues of deep concern to the populace, and
voters feel a stake in initiative legislation unlike that felt for legisla-
tive acts. Court invalidation of initiatives has caused the beginnings
of a voter backlash-both against the initiative process and the judi-
cial system. Surveys support the fact that voters in California are
losing faith in legislation by initiative. The refrain "why should I vote
for the initiative when the courts will just throw it out" is increasingly
heard. At the same time, voters are losing confidence in the judici-
ary-a branch of government that has historically been held in high
esteem. The judicial system was especially cast in a poor light when
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit invalidated Proposi-
tion 140 on state term limits, claiming that voters did not understand
the initiative1'
129. See id
130. See id
131. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Bates
v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Judge Reinhardt represented a
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Following Reinhardt's
ruling that voters had been ignorant of a provision calling for the lifetime ban on
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Perhaps even more alarming for the integrity of the judiciary is
the dramatic transformation of the role of the federal courts in direct
democracy. Once an occasional arbiter of civil rights, the federal
courts have recently become part and parcel of an overall opposition
campaign strategy. Opponents of initiatives have come to realize
that different judicial selection processes have created different judi-
cial cultures between the state and federal courts-with the federal
courts less inclined to defer to initiatives. As a result, opposition
campaigns in California are now more likely to challenge initiatives
in federal court and to bypass the state court system altogether. In
essence, federal district judges are being integrated into the politics
of initiative campaigns.
Perhaps this "politicization" of the federal judiciary cannot be
avoided, but the process by which the courts review the-constitu-
tionality of initiatives must be fair and balanced and perceived as
such. A simple step of returning to the time-honored legal tradition
of hearing challenges to state laws-in this case initiatives-before a
panel of three federal district court judges would encourage greater
deliberateness in the process of judicial review and would strengthen
the legitimacy of the judges' decisions.
officials holding the same office after a given term, an 11-judge en banc panel of
the same court reversed the three-judge panel decision by a nine-to-two vote.
See Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3492
(U.S. Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-1173). Judge David Thompson, who wrote the ma-
jority opinion for the en banc panel, noted that extensive media coverage, oppo-
sition campaign literature warning of the lifetime ban, and voter rejection of a
more limited term limits proposal on the same ballot made it clear voters knew
what they were doing. See id. at 846.
While agreeing with Thompson on the result, three judges argued that
Thompson went too far by deciding on the merits of the case. Judges Schroeder,
Rymer and O'Scannlain lamented that the California Supreme Court should
have had the last word on the issue when it upheld the initiative six years earlier.
See id. at 858 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
In a sarcastic note, Judge O'Scannlain wrote: "Searching the Constitution,
I am unable to locate an 'ignorant voter clause' that vests federal courts with the
power to review voter-enacted legislation to ensure that enough people were ca-
pable of understanding what they had voted for...." Id. at 853 (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
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APPENDIX A
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES CHALLENGED IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS: 1964 THROUGH 1990 PRIMARY ELECIiON
YEAR PRPOP. DESCRIPTION PRE OR POST RESULT LEVEL OF COURT
NUMBER ELEC. Rnv. State State/Fed. Federal
1964 14 Fair housing Post-Election Invalidated X
1964 15 Pay television Post-Election Invalidated x
1972 21 School busing Post-Election Substantially x
Invalidated
1974 9 Political reform Post-Election Substantially x
Upheld
1978 7 Death penalty Post-Election Substantially x
Upheld
1978 13 Property taxes Post-Election Upheld x
1980 10 Reapportionment Pre-Election Substantially x
Upheld
1980 11 Reapportionment Pre-Election Substantially x
Upheld
1980 12 Reapportionment Pre-Election Substantially x
Upheld
1982 6 Inheritance tax Post-Election Invalidated x
1983 Removed Sebastiani Pre-Election Invalidated x
I reapportionment
1984 24 Legislative reform Post-Election Substantially x
I _Invalidated
1984 Removed Balanced budget Pre-Election Invalidated x
1986 62 Taxation Post-Election Substantially x
Upheld
1988 Removed No-fault insurance Pre-Election Invalidated x
1988 68 Campaign finance Post-Election Invalidated x
1988 73 Campaign finance Post-Election Invalidated x
1988 96 AIDS testing Post-Election Upheld x
1988 103 Insurance reform Post-Election Substantially x
I____I_ Upheld
1988 105 Disclosure Post-Election Invalidated x
June 115 Victims' rights Post-Election Substantially x
1990 Upheld
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APPENDIX B
CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES CHALLENGED IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS: 1990 THROUGH 1996 GENERAL ELECTION
YEAR PRPOP. DESCRIPTION PRE OR POST RESULT LEVEL OF COURT
NUMBER ELEc. REV. State State/Fed. Federal
Nov. 140 Term limits Post-Election Substantially x
1990 upheld
1992 164 Congressional term Post-Election Invalidated x
limits
1994 184 Three strikes Post-Election Substantially x
upheld
1994 187 Immigration Post-Election Substantially x
invalidated,
appealed
1996 198 Open primary Post-Election Upheld, x
appealed I
1996 208 Campaign finance Post-Election Invalidated, x
appealed
1966 209 Affirmative action Post-Election Upheld x
1996 213 Drunk driver suits Post-Election Substantially x
upheld III
1996 215 Marijuana Post-Election Substantially x
I _ I_ _ I upheld
